Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide by Brickey, Kathleen F.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 2
Issue 4 Symposium on Corporate Social Responsibility Article 3
1-1-2012
Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for
Criminal Homicide
Kathleen F. Brickey
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide, 2 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 753
(1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol2/iss4/3
DEATH IN THE WORKPLACE: CORPORATE
LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL HOMICIDEt
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY*
INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 1985, a Cook County Illinois trial judge an-
nounced criminal homicide verdicts that sent shock waves
through the nation's business community. Concluding an
eight week nationally publicized bench trial, Circuit Judge
Ronald Banks pronounced the Film Recovery Systems Corpo-
ration guilty of involuntary manslaughter and three of its of-
ficers guilty of murder in connection with the death of Stefan
Golab, an undocumented Polish immigrant who succumbed
to cyanide fumes while working at the firm's silver-reclama-
tion plant.'
Until these verdicts attracted our collective attention, the
concept of corporate homicide prosecutions seemed anoma-
lous. More curious still, the conviction of corporate execu-
tives for murder in connection with a work-related death was
thought to be unprecedented. Extraordinary as they seemed,
however, these verdicts signaled the development of similar
trends elsewhere in the country and presaged announcements
that district attorneys in Los Angeles and in Milwaukee
county planned to investigate every workplace death occur-
Copyright 1986 by Kathleen F. Brickey.
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis.
1. People v. Film Recovery Systems, Report of Proceedings 10-11
(June 14, 1985) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Report of Proceed-
ings]. One of two related corporations indicted along with Film Recovery
Systems was also found guilty. Id. The company, Metallic Marketing Sys-
tems, was a half owner of the plant when the death occurred. Id. at 8. Of
the two other individuals who were indicted, the judge dismissed the case
against one at the close of the prosecution's case, Koszczuk, Judge Frees One
Exec in Cyanide Trial, The Daily Herald (Chicago), May 15, 1985, at 1, and
the other was not tried because the Governor of Utah refused the State of
Illinois' request for extradition. Gibson, A Worker's Death Spurs Murder
Trial, The Nat'l L.J., May 20, 1985, at 6. All of the defendants who were
convicted of criminal homicide were also convicted of 14 counts of reckless
conduct. Report of Proceedings 10-11. As of the date of this writing, the
convictions are on appeal. Notices of Appeal (on file with the author).
Because a trial transcript was unavailable, this article relies upon court
records on file with the author and extensive press coverage of the trial as
sources of factual details about this prosecution.
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ring within their respective jurisdictions for possible criminal
violations.2
These developments have created a predictable set of
concerns. Pursuit of aggressive prosecutorial policies may
mean, for example, that every bad business judgment has po-
tential criminal repercussions. If that is true, or perceived to
be true, we must ask whether management can function ef-
fectively in that environment. Those who say it cannot argue
that to subject companies and their managers to criminal lia-
bility on the basis of day-to-day business decisions would have
"devastating effects" on the manner in which American busi-
ness enterprises are conducted.' This and other pragmatic
concerns-among which are counted the dangers sometimes
inherent in the workplace-are making management wary.
These developments have also created concern that local
law enforcement agencies are intruding into a domain in
which Congress has delegated primary (and perhaps exclu-
sive) jurisdiction to federal regulatory agencies. In the view
of some, comprehensive federal statutes that address the
problem of workplace hazards should preempt application of
conventional state criminal statutes to sanction employers for
creating or tolerating unsafe work environments." Businesses
that operate nation-wide, the argument runs, should be gov-
erned by a single, cohesive, civil and criminal regulatory
scheme instead of an incoherent patchwork of federal, state
and local regulations.
But perhaps the most perplexing problem confronting
the business community is that of identifying a comprehensi-
ble rule of law under which corporations and their officers
are held criminally responsible for workplace deaths and inju-
ries. The Film Recovery Systems indictments charged that
Mr. Golab was a victim of criminal homicide. But where is
the instrumentality of death that felled him? There is, after
2. Middleton, Prosecutors Get Tough on Safety, The Nat'l L.J., April
21, 1986, at 1. See also Comment, Corporate Homicide: Will Michigan Follow
Suit?, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 65 (1984) (considering viability of recent man-
slaughter prosecution initiated against General Dynamics Corporation);
Lawyers' Concerns Over Government Tactics Aired at ABA Convention, 39 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2400, 2405 (Aug. 27, 1986) (describing negligent homicide
and reckless endangerment charges brought against PGP Corporation, a
unit of Gerald Metals, Inc., for carbon monoxide poisonings of four secur-
ity guards, one of whom died).
3. Gibson, Murder Trial Set for Execs of Factory, Chicago Tribune,
April 14, 1985, at 1 (quoting Elliot Samuels, one of the defense attorneys
in the FRS prosecution).
4. See Middleton, supra note 2.
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all, no smoking gun or blood-stained weapon to incriminate
these managers or the enterprise they controlled. And assum-
ing there were, who would have wielded it? Who confronted
this man and ended his life?
These issues are compelling, for we will rarely identify a
corporate agent who has committed a direct act of aggression
against the dead or injured worker. We are speaking, instead,
of liability predicated as much upon what corporate officers
neglect to do as it is upon their affirmative conduct.' Thus,
an underlying duty to act must be found, and it is here-in
the source, nature and scope of that duty-that we gain in-
sights into the governing rule of law. Itis here that we find
the conceptual basis for treating workplace "accidents" as as-
saults, batteries and homicides under the substantive law of
crimes. 6
I. THE FILM RECOVERY SYSTEMS CASE-A PARADIGM
The allegation in the Film Recovery case is, at bottom, a
charge that the company and its managers exposed Mr. Go-
lab to workplace hazards that caused his untimely demise.
The specific hazard was hydrogen cyanide gas, the byproduct
of a cyanide solution used to recover silver from exposed
x-ray film. Film Recovery Systems employees were exposed to
the fumes directly while working around open cyanide vats
5. It is not always clear whether particular conduct should be char-
acterized as an act or an omission. In Film Recovery Systems, for example,
it would be equally logical to allege that the defendants stored cyanide in
open, unventilated vats as it would be to allege that they failed to provide
for proper storage of the cyanide. Notwithstanding that the indictment
generally charged the defendants with causing Golab's death through acts
of commission and omission, however, the only enumerated acts of com-
mission were the defendants' operation of the firm and their employment
of Stefan Golab. Murder Indictment, People v. O'Neil (February 10, 1984)
(on file with the author). The only offending conduct described with any
particularity consisted of omissions. See infra text accompanying note 55.
The prosecution thus was treated as a case of omission throughout. Once a
duty to act is established, the distinction between acts (improper perform-
ance) and omissions (nonperformance) loses its importance.
6. See generally Glasbeek & Rowland, Are Injuring and Killing at
Work Crimes?, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 506 (1979); Radin, Corporate Criminal
Liability for Employee-endangering Activities, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 39
(1983); Spurgeon & Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate
Conduct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400 (1981); Comment, Corporate
Criminal Liability for Homicide: Has the Fiction Been Extended too Far?, 4 J.L.
& COM. 95 (1984); Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Can
the Criminal Law Control Corporate Behavior?, 38 Sw. L.J. 1275 (1985); Com-
ment, supra note 2.
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and to ambient gas that hovered elsewhere in the plant as
well.
On February 10, 1983, Stefan Golab left his post at a vat
after complaining of nausea and dizziness. By the time he
could reach the adjacent lunchroom, he had begun to shake
and foam at the mouth. By the time his coworkers could
carry him outside, his heart had stopped beating. By the time
paramedics could transport him to a hospital, he was dead.
That death is the paradigmatic homicide.
A. The Manslaughter Charge against FRS
If we are to rely on reported case law as an historical
measure of the frequency with which prosecutors have
charged corporations with criminal homicide, we must con-
clude that these prosecutions were indeed anomalies. Corpo-
rate homicide prosecutions appear throughout this century as
relatively isolated phenomena, 7 only a few of which were in-
7. Fifteen reported American judicial decisions are direct out-
growths of corporate homicide prosecutions. See Granite Constr. Co. v. Su-
perior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. App. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913);
State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917); People v.
Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); People v. Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d
327, 470 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1983); People v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 77 Misc. 2d
784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); United States v. Van Schaick,
134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); People v. Rochester Ry. & Light, 195
N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909); State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360
P.2d 530 (1961); Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 343 Pa.
Super. 387, 494 A.2d 1139 (1985); Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus
Lines, 283 Pa. Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980); Commonwealth v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., 102 Pitt. Legal J. 348 (1954); Commonwealth v. Punx-
sutawney Street Passenger Ry., 24 Pa. C. 25 (1899); Vaughan & Sons, Inc.
v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
Although it has been suggested that an early New Hampshire case in
which a corporation was indicted in connection with a death was the first
application of a homicide statute to a corporate entity, Maakestad, A Histor-
ical Survey of Corporate Homicide in the United States: Could It Be Prosecuted in
Illinois?, 69 ILL. B.J. 772, 774 (1981), that case was not, strictly speaking, a
criminal homicide prosecution. Instead, the New Hampshire case involved
a proceeding under a statute that made the proprietors of railroad compa-
nies liable to the estate of anyone killed as a result of the railroad's negli-
gence. Boston, C. & M. R.R. v. State, 32 N.H. 215, 220 (plaintiff's argu-
ment), 226-28 (opinion of the court). The indictment, in fact, did not
charge the plaintiffs with the commission of a crime. The indictment
charged them with neglect of their duties and was the statutorily pre-
scribed method to provide recovery for the decedent's estate. Id. at 223
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spired by industrial accidents."
The relative rarity of these prosecutions reflects in part
the difficulty of convincing courts that juristic persons are
proper homicide defendants. For despite the settled rule that
corporations are capable of committing intentional torts,9
many courts have been reluctant to hold corporations capa-
ble of committing crimes with elements of personal violence
or an evil state of mind. 0
Prosecutors in corporate homicide cases have encoun-
tered definitional obstacles as well. In jurisdictions where the
common-law" or statutory 2 definition of criminal homicide
was the killing of one human being by another, for example,
most courts found that the "another"-i.e., the slayer-must
(argument for the state). In effect providing wrongful death recovery, the
legislature required the action to proceed by way of indictment to insure
that the action was well founded, and limited the amount of the fine that
could be assessed to protect railroads from excessive awards. Id. at 226
(opinion of the court).
8. Among those that were, see Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior
Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983) (approving man-
slaughter prosecution for deaths of 7 construction workers); People v.
Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159
(1980) (disapproving, on ground of causation, manslaughter prosecution
for deaths of 6 workers killed in factory explosion), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1031 (1981); People v. Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d 327, 470 NXY.S.2d 158 (1983)
(approving manslaughter prosecution for death of worker killed in factory
fire); People v. Ebasco. Servs., Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (approving manslaughter prosecution for deaths of 2 work-
ers killed when cofferdam broke).
9. See, e.g., Philadelphia, W. & B.R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 202 (1859) (libel); Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530
(1853) (malicious prosecution); Evansville & C.R.R. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70
(1866) (assault and battery); Fogg v. Boston & L.R.R., 148 Mass. 513, 20
N.E. 109 (1889) (libel); Reed v. Home Say. Bank, 130 Mass. 443 (1881)
(malicious prosecution); Brokaw v. New Jersey R.R. & Transp., 32 N.J.L.
328 (1867) (assault and battery).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney Street Passenger Ry.,
24 Pa. C. 25 (1899); State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d
530 (1961); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983); Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W.
459 (1913). See generally Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief
History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q 393, 410-15 (1982).
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153
S.W. 459 (1913); Commonwealth v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 102 Prrrs.
LEGAL J. 348 (1954).
12. See, e.g., People v. Rochester Ry. & Light, 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E.
22 (1909). Cf State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530
(1961) (homicide statute defining offense in terms of a person who kills
another).
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be a member of the same class as the victim-i.e., a human
being. 8
A few early cases permitted prosecutions to proceed,
however, either because the court disagreed that the com-
mon-law definition was so restrictive as to require a human
slayer 14 or on the ground that under a statute making owners
of vessels amenable to prosecution for manslaughter, a corpo-
ration clearly could be an "owner."'"
More recently amended penal codes have decreased the
number of obstacles to corporate homicide prosecutions by
omitting the troublesome "by another" element,"0 by includ-
ing corporations in the definition of "person,""' or by creat-
ing a comprehensive statutory scheme of corporate criminal
liability in general.' 8
Considering our paradigm within this framework, the
Film Recovery Systems indictment could not, in all prob-
ability, have been maintained prior to a 1961 revision of the
Illinois Criminal Code. Before that revision, Illinois courts
had severely restricted corporate criminal liability to liability
for misdemeanors for which a fine was an authorized punish-
ment. 9 Since corporate prosecutions for felonies20 and for
13. People v. Rochester Ry. & Light, 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22
(1909); Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459
(1913); Commonwealth v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 102 Pitt. Legal J. 348
(1954).
14. See State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685
(1917).
15. See United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1904).
16. See, e.g., Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App.
3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983).
17. See, e.g., People v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354
N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus
Lines, 283 Pa. Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980) (vehicular homicide statute).
But see People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 303 n.1, 414
N.E.2d 660, 664 n.1, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163 n.1 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1031 (1981) (assuming, without deciding, that manslaughter and neg-
ligent homicide statutes apply to corporations, although concluding that no
precedent for such a prosecution could be found in the jurisdiction). Cf
State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961) (statute that
includes corporation as a person unless context otherwise requires does not
make corporation liable for homicide, a crime rooted in "inherently
human relations").
18. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 500.080(12), 502.050, 534.050 (Bald-
win 1984). The Kentucky Court of Appeals construed § 534.050 as author-
izing corporate manslaughter prosecutions in Commonwealth v. Former
LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
19. A corporation could be prosecuted for misdemeanors punisha-
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offenses only punishable by death or imprisonment 21 thus
were precluded, the Illinois rule effectively shielded corpora-
tions from criminal homicide prosecutions.2"
Even without these judicially imposed general limitations
on corporate criminal liability, the Illinois homicide statutes
themselves would have posed formidable obstacles for corpo-
rate prosecutions. For while they defined murder and man-
slaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human being" without
reference to the classification of the slayer,2" the only author-
ized punishment for these crimes was death or imprison-
ment 2 -penalties obviously ill-suited for corporate defend-
ants. Thus, it is by no means clear that corporations could
have incurred criminal homicide liability under those statutes
unless the issues of guilt and amenability to punishment could
somehow be severed. While theoretically possible,25 that op-
tion was foreclosed by an Illinois criminal code provision re-
quiring that all offenses defined by the code "shall be prose-
ble by fine, imprisonment, or both, People v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 605, 2
N.E.2d 942, 944 (1936), because the two penalties function independently,
People v. Duncan, 363 Il. 495, 497, 2 N.E.2d 705, 706 (1936). See also
People v. McArdle, 295 III. App. 149, 14 N.E.2d 683, writ dismissed, 370
II1. 513, 19 N.E.2d 328 (1939).
20. See People v. Strong, 363 III. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936).
21. See People v. Duncan, 363 Ill. 495, 2 N.E.2d 705 (1936).
22. See generally Maakestad, supra note 7.
For examples of cases in which Illinois courts upheld corporate criminal
prosecutions in other contexts, see People v. City of Chicago, 256 Ill. 558,
100 N.E. 194 (1912) (municipal corporation criminally liable for violation
of labor law limiting hours of employment of females in factories); Chi-
cago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N.E. 770 (1905) (con-
spiracy to fix prices); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. People, 95 Ill. 313 (1880), affd,
108 U.S. 541 (1883) (extortion).
23. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 358, 361 (1959).
In contrast, the voluntary manslaughter statute referred to acts of ag-
gression directed toward the "person killing," id. § 362, and the reckless
homicide statute defined the offense in terms of a "person" who recklessly
drives a vehicle and kills. Id. § 364.
24. III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 360, 364 (1959).
25. Compare State ex rel. Losey v. Willard, 54 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla.
1951) and Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 322, 153
S.W. 459, 463 (1913) (corporation may not be convicted of offenses for
which the only penalty provided is death or imprisonment) with United
States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 602 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (overruling
demurrers to indictment under manslaughter statute providing only pen-
alty of imprisonment on ground that "[i]t seems a more reasonable alterna-
tive that Congress inadvertently omitted to provide a suitable punishment
for the offense, when committed by a corporation, than that it intended to
give the owner impunity simply because it happened to be a corporation").
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cuted and on conviction punished as by this act is prescribed,
and not otherwise. "26
The Revised Illinois Criminal Code diminishes the theo-
retical barriers to corporate homicide prosecutions in several
important respects. Film Recovery Systems was indicted
under a statute that provides "[a] person who unintentionally
kills an individual without lawful justification commits invol-
untary manslaughter" if the death-producing acts are per-
formed recklessly and are likely to cause death or great bod-
ily harm. The term "person" includes "an individual,
public or private corporation, government, partnership, or
unincorporated association." 8 Although the term "individ-
ual" is not defined by statute, the clear implication is that
"individual" denotes only natural persons while "person" de-
notes both natural and juristic persons. A literal reading of
the revised code would thus permit an involuntary man-
slaughter prosecution against a corporate person to go for-
ward,29 and Comments published in the code suggest that the
Revision Committee did indeed contemplate that corpora-
tions might be liable for manslaughter in Illinois.30
26. III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 600 (1959).
27. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1985) (emphasis added).
28. Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 2-15 (1985).
29. It should be noted, however, that courts in two other jurisdic-
tions with similar statutory schemes reached opposite conclusions on the
question whether a corporation was a prosecutable person. Compare Gran-
ite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1983) (corporation may be prosecuted for manslaughter where offense de-
fined as killing of a human being and penal code defines "person" to in-
clude corporation) with Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (corporation may not be prosecuted for man-
slaughter where offense defined as a person causing death of an individual
because all homicides are different degree of same crime; as corporation
cannot commit crimes requiring specific intent and so cannot commit mur-
der, corporation cannot commit manslaughter, a lesser degree of that
crime).
30. See Committee Comments accompanying I11. Ann. Stat., ch. 38,
§ 5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (Section 5-4(a)(2) "provides, in effect, that when a
corporation is indicted for a felony such as embezzlement, involuntary man-
slaughter, and the like, the corporation may not be held liable unless the
criminal conduct was performed or participated in by the Board of Direc-
tors or by a high managerial agent.") (emphasis added). These Comments
amplify a provision fashioned after the Model Penal Code section that de-
fines the limits of corporate criminal liability. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,
§ 2-15 with Model Penal Code § 2.07 (P.O.D. 1962).
The Revision Committee was not, however, a legislative committee. It
was, instead, a committee appointed by the Illinois and Chicago Bar As-
sociations at the urging of the Governor and the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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B. The Murder Charge against FRS Executives
It has long been recognized that corporate officers and
agents who engage in criminal conduct during the course of
their employment are personally accountable for their mis-
deeds. 1 As early as the beginning of the eighteenth cen-
tury-well before the common law worked through the theo-
retical barriers to prosecuting corporate entities-Chief
Justice Holt observed in a dictum that "[a] corporation is not
indictable but the particular members of it are."32 By the
middle of the next century, the amenability of corporate
agents to criminal prosecution for offenses committed on be-
half of the corporation was a point on which there could be
"no doubt."3 3
But these judges were not speaking of murder. For the
most part 4 they were seeking to redress the creation of a
public nuisance,3 ' the operation of a corporate enterprise
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, Committee Foreword to Tentative Final Draft of the
Proposed Illinois Revised Criminal Code of 1961 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
31. See, e.g., Elsberry v. State, 52 Ala. 8, 10 (1875) ("it is the natural
persons in and by whom it lives, moves, and operates that the law generally
holds responsible for its offences against the public"); State v. Great Works
Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41, 44 (1841) ("when a crime or misdemeanor
is committed under color of corporate authority, the individuals acting in
the business . . . should be indicted"); Moore v. State, 48 Miss. 147 (1873),
writ dismissed, 88 U.S. 636 (1875); State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L.
360 (1852); Crowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464 (1881); State v. Patton, 26
N.C. (4 Ired.) 16, 19 (1843) ("the individuals . . . were bound, by virtue of
their offices, faithfully to exert all their powers and apply all their means,
as such officers, to the keeping of the road in order; and . . . for a default
in this public duty they were liable"); Ex parte Schmidt, 2 Tex. App. 196
(1877); The Queen v. Great North of England Ry., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294
(Q.B. 1846); The Queen v. Stephens, I L.R.-Q.B. 702 (1866); Rex v. Med-
ley, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246 (K.B. 1834). See generally 1 K. Brickey, CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 5:02 (1984). This principle is now codified in the
Illinois statutes. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 5-5(a) (1985).
32. Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701).
33. The Queen v. Great North of England Ry., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294
(Q.B. 1846). See also Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 469 (1881) ("[it has
. . . for years been the law of this State that the officers of a corporation
might be indicted for the neglect of a duty resting upon it").
Corporate agents could be prosecuted as principals, aiders and abettors,
or as accessories. State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41
(1841). See also State v. Pincus, 41 N.J. Super. 454, 125 A.2d 420 (App.
Div. 1956), and cases cited therein.
34. But see Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464 (1881) (indictment of
agent of incorporated benevolent association for endangering the welfare
of a child).
35. 'ee, e.g., State v. Patton, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 16 (1843) (indictment
19871
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without a proper license se or without paying required taxes,3 7
the pursuit of unauthorized business activities,8 violation of
regulatory statutes 9 and the like. In Film Recovery Systems,
on the other hand, the former president, the plant manager
and the foreman of the company were prosecuted for killing
an employee.
Notwithstanding the relatively greater frequency of
purely regulatory prosecutions against corporate officers, as
early as the beginning of this century managing officers of a
steamship company were indicted under a federal manslaugh-
ter statute for failure to provide operable emergency equip-
ment on a vessel that caught fire and sank, killing 900 people
aboard. 0 Prosecutions initiated under conventional man-
slaughter laws sporadically followed thereafter.4
of president and directors of turnpike company for letting turnpike be-
come ruinous); The Queen v. Stephens, 1 L.R.-Q.B. 1866) (indictment of
slate quarry owner for throwing debris into navigable waters); Rex v. Med-
ley, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246 (K.B. 1834) (indictment of directors and employ-
ees of gas company for discharging waste into river).
36. See, e.g., Elsberry v. State, 52 Ala. 8 (1875).
37. Ex parte Schmidt, 2 Tex. App. 196 (1877).
38. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 48 Miss. 147 (1873), writ dismissed, 88
U.S. 636 (1875) (indictment of agent for selling lottery ticket).
39. Cf. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 407 n.l (1962) (observ-
ing that in 1914 alone there were 40 cases in which corporate officers were
indicted for Sherman Act violations).
40. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Godin, 374 Mass. 120, 371 N.E.2d
438 (1977) (prosecution of company president for deaths of employees
killed in fireworks plant explosion), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) (prosecution
of nightclub owner for deaths of patrons killed in fire); People v. Warner-
Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981) (prosecution of corporation and individ-
ual officers and employees for deaths of workers in chewing gum plant ex-
plosion); People v. Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d 327, 470 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1983) (pros-
ecution of president and other managers of company for death of
employee killed in warehouse fire); People v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 77
Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (prosecution of corpora-
tion and unidentified individuals for deaths of two workers killed when im-
properly constructed cofferdam broke); People v. Harris, 74 Misc. 353, 134
N.Y.S. 409 (Gen. Sess. 1911) (prosecution of owners and proprietors of
factory for deaths of employees killed in fire); State v. Ginsberg, 15 Wash.
App. 244, 548 P.2d 329 (1976) (prosecution of corporation and part-owner
for death of tenant killed in fire); State v. Serebin, 119 Wis. 2d 837, 350
N.W.2d 65 (1984) (prosecution of nursing home administrator for homi-
cide by reckless conduct for death of nursing home resident). See also A
Death at Work Can Put the Boss in Jail, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1987, at 37;
Kendall, Criminal Charges on the Rise for Workplace Injuries, Deaths, OCCUPA-
TIONAL HAZARDS, Dec. 1985, at 49.
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Thus, to the extent that the Film Recovery Systems pros-
ecution sought to hold the managers criminally responsible
for a death they caused during the course of their employ-
ment, the case against the officers-like that against the cor-
poration itself-is unusual but not pioneering. To the extent
that the charge against the Film Recovery Systems officers
was murder-as opposed to manslaughter-no one could re-
call a single precedent for the prosecution.
II. BREACH OF DUTY
The indictment in the Film Recovery Systems case did
not allege that any of the defendants physically assaulted Mr.
Golab. The fault in this case-if fault there may be-lies in
their conduct of the enterprise and their failure to act where
action was called for. The fault, therefore, is a derogation of
duty. But breach of a duty will trigger liability only if the ob-
ligation is imposed by common law or statute."' Breach of a
moral duty alone does not suffice." Thus we must seek the
nature and source of the duty that triggered this extraordi-
nary criminal prosecution.
Common-law duties often arise by virtue of special per-
sonal or contractual relationships." Duties based on jural re-
lationships such as parent and child"' or husband and wife""
42. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3(a) (2d
ed. 1986); R. Perkins, CRIMINAL LAW 658-69 (3d ed. 1982); Model Penal
Code § 2.01 Comment (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). The duty may, and
customarily does, arise under the civil law.
43. "The non-action of one who has no legal duty to act is noth-
ing." Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633, 637
(1920). Cf State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1981) (failure to warn
daughter-in-law of plan to kill her, though morally reprehensible, does not
constitute criminal conduct); Anderson v. State, 27 Tex. App. 177, 11
S.W. 33 (1889) (brakeman who neglects to see child on tracks or who sees
child but neglects to signal engineer to stop train not liable because he has
no legal duty to signal).
44. Duties to act may also arise by virtue of special circumstances
such as creation of the peril, voluntary assumption of care, and ownership
of land. See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 42, at § 3.3(a);
Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of the
Law in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101 (1984).
45. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960)
(parental duty to protect unemancipated child from harm by third person);
State v. Mason, 18 N.C. App. 433, 197 S.E.2d 79 (parental duty to feed
child and prevent it from starving), cert. denied, 283 N.C. 669, 197 S.E.2d
878 (1973) ; Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa.C. 56 (1915) (parental duty to
provide medical care).
46. State v. Smith, 65 Me. 257 (1876) (husband has duty to provide
clothing and shelter for insane wife in winter); State v. Mally, 139 Mont.
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are personal obligations owed by one to the other. Duties
arising from contractual relationships, on the other hand,
may be obligations that run either to the public47 or to partic-
ular individuals for whose benefit the contract has been
made,4" including one's servants.
In the past, a master's contractual duties to rescue a sea-
man who falls overboard49 and to provide a stricken servant
emergency medical care"0 have provided foundations for
criminal homicide charges. 1 Liability imposed under these
theories is limited, however, in that it arises only when the
employer fails to respond to an emergency that renders the
servant helpless."2
To be sure, Stefan Golab's rapidly deteriorating condi-
tion utterly disabled him. But when the emergency arose,
paramedics were quickly called to the scene. 3 Thus, the
599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961) (husband has duty to provide medical care to
ailing wife). But see People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128
(1907) (man has no legal duty to aid mistress rendered helpless by mor-
phine) (criticized in Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 624
(1958)).
47. See, e.g., State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 A. 609 (1937) (railroad
crossing watchman who failed to warn motorist of oncoming train liable
for manslaughter); State v. Harrison, 107 N.J.L. 213, 152 A. 867 (1931)
(same).
48. See, e.g., People v. Montecino, 66 Cal. App. 2d 85, 152 P.2d 5
(1944) (defendant who assumes contractual obligation to care for elderly
woman may be criminally liable for death resulting from neglect of that
duty); Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (recognizing
that if defendant assumed contractual duty to care for another's infant,
neglect of that duty could result in criminal liability for infant's death).
49. See, e.g., Reyes v. Vantage, 609 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1980);
Kiesel v. American Trading & Prod. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 673, 679 (D. Md.
1972).
50. The Queen v. Brown, 1 N.W.T.L.R. (No. 4) 35 (1893) (reported
more fully in 1 Terr. L.R. 475 (1893)) (master liable for failure to obtain
proper medical treatment for servant rendered helpless by severe
frostbite).
51. Id.; United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800 (N.D. Cal. 1864)
(No. 15,450).
52. Cf Restatement (Second) of Agency § 512 (1957) (duty to pro-
tect endangered or hurt employee); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314B
(1963 & 1964) (same).
53. See Dold, Ex-Worker Says Firm Masked Cyanide Peril, Chicago
Tribune, April 16, 1985, at 1 (quoting testimony of co-worker). The
paramedics did not, however, administer a cyanide antidote because no one
present could (or would) confirm that Golab had been exposed to cyanide.
Siegel, Murder Case a Corporate Landmark, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15,
1985, at 1, col. 1.
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indictment did not fault the defendants for neglecting to re-
spond to the emergency." It faulted instead their failure to
prevent the emergency from arising at all.
The indictment charged that the defendants failed to ad-
vise Mr. Golab of the nature and dangers of the chemicals
used in the plant or to instruct him in the proper handling of
the deadly poisons; that they failed to provide safety and first-
aid equipment and health-monitoring systems; and that they
failed to provide for proper storage, detoxification and dispo-
sition of cyanide used in the ordinary course of the com-
pany's business.5 5 These allegations are clearly based upon
omissions to act. 56 The indictment, however, failed to specify
what legal duty would make these omissions actionable.
A. Common-Law and Statutory Duties
In our effort to define the defendants' duty toward Mr.
Golab, we will rarely discover the source of the duty articu-
lated in the reported criminal case law. It is found, instead, in
the established body of agency and tort law that defines the
limits of a master's obligation to protect his employees from
workplace hazards.
Employers have a common-law duty to exercise ordinary
care to provide a reasonably safe workplace in which their
employees may perform their day-to-day tasks.57 Employees,
54. The indictment did, however, enumerate the failure to provide
first aid equipment as one of the omissions upon which the prosecution was
based, Murder Indictment, State v. O'Neil (April, 1984) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Murder Indictment], and after Mr. Golab's death the
company was cited for OSHA violations that included failing to stock cya-
nide antidote in first aid kits. Owens, Death of Worker Puts Factory Safety on
Trial, Newsday, June 6, 1985, at 4 (Nassau ed.). To the extent that the
availability of additional medical supplies might have improved Golab's
condition, then, the indictment did fault the defendants for being ill-
equipped to respond as effectively as they might have done.
55. Murder Indictment, supra note 54.
56. But see supra note 5.
57. Northern Pacific R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1886);
Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 217 (1880); People v. Harris, 74
Misc. 353, 361, 134 N.Y.S. 409, 414 (Gen. Sess. 1911); Southern Package
Corp. v. Mitchell, 109 F.2d 609, 610 (5th Cir. 1940); Clark v. Employers
Muts. of Wausau, 297 F. Supp. 286, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1969); McElligott v.
Randolph, 61 Conn. 157, 161, 22 A. 1094, 1095 (1891); Brazil Block Coal
Co. v. Gibson, 160 Ind. 319, 324, 66 N.E. 882, 884 (1903); Lytell v.
Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344, 1347-48 (La. 1982); Hume v. Ft. Halifax
Power Co., 106 Me. 78, 82, 75 A. 300, 302 (1909); Coombs v. New Bed-
ford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572, 596 (1869); Hannah v. Mallinckrodt,
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in turn, are entitled to assume the employer's proper dis-
charge of his obligation to them." To fulfill his duty the em-
ployer must inspect his business premises and equipment as
often as is reasonably necessary,59 repair or alter dangerously
defective conditions,6" and see that rules promulgated to in-
sure workers' safety are enforced."1
The duty to provide a safe workplace is "personal, con-
tinuous and non-delegable." 62 Liability for fulfilling this im-
plied-in-contract obligation cannot, therefore, be discharged
by simply entrusting responsibility for its performance to an-
other.6" The employer remains liable whether the person
who acts in his stead performs the assigned function poorly
or not at all."
Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); Macklin v. Dowler, 53
N.C. App. 488, 490, 281 S.E.2d 164, 165-66 (1981); Overstreet v. Nor-
man, 44 Tenn. App. 343, 349, 314 S.W.2d 47, 50 (1957); J. Weingarten,
Inc. v. Sandefer, 490 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Richland's
Iron Co. v. Elkins, 90 Va. 249, 261, 17 S.E. 890, 894 (1893); Richmond &
D.R. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 165, 167, 9 S.E. 990, 991 (1889); Kasparian v.
Old Nat'l Bank, 6 Wash. App. 514, 517, 494 P.2d 505, 507 (1972). See also
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 492 (1957) (master must exercise due
care to provide reasonably safe working conditions and to warn employees
of risks they might not be reasonably expected to discover for themselves).
58. Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Gibson, 160 Ind. 319, 324, 66 N.E.
882, 884 (1903); Richmond & D.R. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 165, 167, 9 S.E.
990, 991 (1889).
59. Clark v. Employers Muts. of Wausau, 297 F. Supp. 286, 290
(E.D. Pa. 1969); Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Gibson, 160 Ind. 319, 328, 66
N.E. 882, 885 (1903); Kasparian v. Old Nat'l Bank, 6 Wash. App. 514,
517, 494 P.2d 505, 507 (1972).
60. Clark v. Employers Muts. of Wausau, 297 F. Supp. 286, 290
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
61. Southern Package Corp. v. Mitchell, 109 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.
1940); J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Sandefer, 490 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973); Kasparian v. Old Nat'l Bank, 6 Wash. App. 514, 517, 494
P.2d 505, 507 (1972).
62. Overstreet v. Norman, 44 Tenn. App. 343, 349, 314 S.W.2d 47,
50 (1957).
63. Northern Pacific R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1886);
Southern Package Corp. v. Mitchell, 109 F.2d 609, 610 (5th Cir. 1940);
McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157, 162, 22 A. 1094, 1095 (1891);
Hume v. Ft. Halifax Power Co., 106 Me. 78, 82-3, 75 A. 300, 302 (1909);
Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572, 599 (1869); Over-
street v. Norman, 44 Tenn. App. 343, 349, 314 S.W.2d 47, 51 (1957); J.
Weingarten, Inc. v. Sandefer, 490 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973);
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It does not follow, however, that employers are insurers
of their employees' safety65 or that they are liable for injuries
caused by obvious and ordinary hazards known to the em-
ployees or merely incident to the business itself.6" Employers
may satisfy the duty to provide a safe workplace by making
reasonable efforts to avoid exposing their employees to risks
greater than those normally incident to the employment"
and by warning workers of special risks and dangerous
conditions. s
As is true in a number of other jurisdictions,69 moreover,
the Illinois legislature has imposed on employers a statutory
duty to protect their employees from workplace hazards. The
Illinois Health and Safety Act requires every employer "to
provide reasonable protection to the lives, health and safety
[of employees] and to furnish [them] employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause [them] death or serious
physical harm. '"70
It thus appears that the Film Recovery Systems indict-
ment could well have premised liability either upon breach of
a common-law contractual duty developed under master-ser-
vant law to protect workers from enhanced workplace
hazards associated with an increasingly industrialized econ-
65. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 218-19 (1880); J. Wein-
garten, Inc. v. Sandefer, 490 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Rich-
land's Iron Co. v. Elkins, 90 Va. 249, 261, 17 S.E. 890, 894 (1893); Kas-
parian v. Old Nat'l Bank, 6 Wash. App. 514, 516, 494 P.2d 505, 507
(1972).
66. Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Gibson, 160 Ind. 319, 325, 66 N.E.
882, 884 (1903); Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344, 1348 (La. 1982);
Keith v. Granite Mills, 126 Mass. 90, 91 (1878); Huda v. American Glucose
Co., 154 N.Y. 474, 481-82, 48 N.E. 897, 899 (1897); Richmond & D.R.
Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 165, 167, 9 S.E. 990, 991 (1889).
67. Northern Pacific R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1886);
Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 214 (1880); Richmond & D.R. Co. v.
Williams, 86 Va. 165, 167, 9 S.E. 990, 991 (1889). Cf Richland's Iron Co.
v. Elkins, 90 Va. 249, 261, 17 S.E. 890, 894 (1893) (employer must avoid
exposing employees to extraordinary risks).
68. Hume v. Ft. Halifax Power Co., 106 Me. 78, 82, 75 A. 300, 302
(1909); Engelking v. City of Spokane, 59 Wash. 446, 451, 110 P. 25, 27-28
(1910); Macklin v. Dowler, 53 N.C. App. 488, 490, 281 S.E.2d 164, 166
(1981); Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572, 596 (1869);
Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344, 1348 (La. 1982).
69. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 6400 (Deering 1976); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 408.1011 (1979); N.Y. Labor Law § 200 (McKinney 1986); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 25-2 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986).
70. I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 137.3(a) (1985).
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omy, or upon breach of a statutory duty to safeguard those
same interests."1
III. CULPABILITY
Although the Film Recovery Systems indictment faulted
the defendants for failing to discharge a duty to provide a
reasonably safe workplace, we must recognize that we are
speaking of a duty imposed by civil-not criminal-law, and
that not every breach of a civil duty constitutes a crime. In-
deed, common experience tells us that violation of a civil
duty not to injure normally leads to tort liability or to statu-
tory compensation for the injury under workman's compen-
sation laws. The prosecutor customarily plays no role in this
scheme of liability.
It is necessary, then, to establish a base line to differenti-
ate civil and criminal wrongs. As part of that process, we
must redirect our thinking momentarily and consider the
role of omissions in the criminal law. Criminal liability is
based upon conduct. 2 Although some offenses are defined in
terms of an omission to act, 73 most definitions assume the
commission of affirmative acts. The Illinois homicide statutes,
for example, define homicide as the unlawful killing of a
human being, 7' and the act of killing usually consists of ob-
servable assaultive conduct. An omission to perform a legally
required act, however, may also kill-as, for example, a par-
ent's withholding of food and sustenance from an infant.75
71. A more recently enacted statute could also provide a basis for
future prosecutions based on similar facts. The Toxic Substances Hazards
Disclosure to Employees Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 1401-1419 (1985),
imposes on employers the duty to inform employees of the nature and
hazards of toxic substances to which they are routinely exposed and to
train them in the proper handling of the substances. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §
1419 (1984). This statute was enacted after Mr. Golab's death, however,
and so could not have constitutionally applied retroactively to impose liabil-
ity on the Film Recovery Systems defendants. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 386, 390 (1798).
72. One cannot be subjected to criminal liability for thinking evil
thoughts or for having a certain status, for example.
73. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7202 (1982) (willful failure to collect or pay
over tax); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5322 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (willful failure
to file reports on exporting and importing monetary instruments); 31
U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (willful failure to report
large cash transactions handled through financial institutions).
74. 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 9-3 (1985).
75. See Harrington v. State, 547 S.W.2d 616 and 547 S.W.2d 621
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (parents who permitted 2-year-old child to starve
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Thus, proof of an omission to act is proof of but one ele-
ment-the conduct element-of a crime.7 6 Whether the con-
duct actually constitutes a crime depends in turn on the pres-
ence or absence of each of the other constituent elements of
the offense-as, for example, causation.
As in the case of wrongful death liability in tort, criminal
homicide liability requires a causal relationship between the
conduct and the forbidden result. The conduct must not only
be capable of killing, it must actually cause a death.7 But as-
suming for the moment that our defendants' failure to pro-
vide a safe workplace caused Mr. Golab's death-as Judge
Banks was convinced that it did- what makes one uninten-
tional loss of life a wrongful death under the civil law and
another a criminal homicide? And why were Film Recovery
Systems' officers charged with so serious a crime as murder?
The answer lies in the role of the mental element in
criminal liability. To constitute a crime, prohibited conduct
must be accompanied by a culpable mental state.78 Whereas a
plaintiff suing in tort need only prove negligence (failure to
exercise ordinary care 9) and one seeking recovery under
workmen's compensation law is relieved of proving any fault
at all,80 the state is not similarly situated in a criminal homi-
cide prosecution. For in addition to proving the defendant's
conduct bore a causal relationship to the death, the state
must also establish mens rea, a blameworthy state of mind.
Film Recovery Systems and its managers were charged
with different degrees of homicide-involuntary manslaugh-
ter and murder-that are distinguished from one another
only by the required state of mind. Involuntary manslaughter
found guilty of murder).
76. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 2-2 (1985) (" 'Act' " includes a failure
or omission to take action).
77. For a brief discussion of the problem of proving causation in
homicide by omission cases, see LaFave, supra note 42, at § 3.3(d); Note,
State v. Serebin: Causation and the Criminal Liability of Nursing Home Admin-
istrators, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 339. For a more extended consideration of cau-
sation in cases of omission see A. Becht & F. Miller, THE TEST OF FACTUAL
CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES §§ 2, 3 (1961).
78. There are exceptions, however. Some criminal statutes, particu-
larly those defining public welfare offenses, may impose strict liability for
violations. See Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liabil-
ity Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337 (1982).
79. See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON TORTS ch. 5 (5th ed. 1984).
80. See generally id. at 572-76; J. Dooley, MODERN TORT LAW §§
22.14-22.14.40 (1982 Rev.).
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consists of recklessly causing the death of another.8 1 To act
recklessly in this context is to act with conscious disregard of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause
death. To; be reckless, the actor's disregard of the risk must
constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care a rea-
sonable person would observe under the circumstances. 2
Manslaughter is augmented to murder when the conduct
is accompanied by a more blameworthy state of mind. Mur-
der, under Illinois law, consists of death-producing conduct
that is accompanied by intent to do great bodily harm, by
knowledge that the conduct will cause death, 83 or by knowl-
edge that the conduct creates a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm." The prosecution did not proceed, then,
on the theory that the corporate managers carelessly disre-
garded an insignificant risk. It proceeded instead on the the-
ory that these men knew it was likely that workers exposed to
conditions existing at the plant would be killed or seriously
injured. That is, indeed, a serious accusation.
And what evidence warrants such harsh accusations
against them? Let us examine the circumstances that led to
their prosecution.
The Employees: At any given time approximately 30 workers
were employed to man the cyanide vats. 5 Most were His-
panic or Polish immigrants86 and most, if not all, were un-
documented and non-English speaking.87 In the prosecutor's
view, this hiring practice was inspired by the belief that the
immigrants would be reluctant to complain about conditions
81. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1985).
82. 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 4-6 (1985).
83. A person has knowledge that his conduct will cause death when
he is consciously aware that the conduct is practically certain to bring
about that result. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 4-5(b) (1985).
84. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 9-1(a).
85. Tucker, Execs on Trial Today in '83 Cyanide Death, Chicago Sun-
Times, April 15, 1985, at 16; see Owens, supra note 54, at 4.
86. Of the former workers who were potential witnesses at trial, 89
were Hispanic and 15 were Polish. Gibson, supra note 3. Those called as
witnesses testified through an interpreter. See, e.g., Nelson, 'I Always Felt
Dizzy, Had Headaches': Plant Worker, The Daily Herald (Chicago), April 18,
1985, at 1; Dold, supra note 53.
87. Office of the State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois, Press Re-
lease: Five Film Recovery Systems Managers Indicted for Murder in Death
of Laborer: Three Corporations Also Indicted for Manslaughter (October
19, 1983) (on file with the author) [hereinafter State's Attorney October
Press Release].
[Vol. 2
DEATH IN THE WORKPLACE
at the plant, partly because of their inability to understand
English and partly out of fear that their illegal status would
be exposed. 8
Stefan Golab, an undocumented Polish immigrant who
spoke no English, had worked at the Film Recovery Systems
plant for about two and a half months.
Plant Conditions: The workers mixed dry sodium cyanide with
water to produce a cyanide solution in which used film chips
were immersed as part of the silver recovery process.8 9 The
cyanide solution was stored in open vats which gave off nox-
ious fumes that caused burning in the eyes and throat, diffi-
cult breathing, dizziness, and nausea. These symptoms were
common not only among employees who were regularly ex-
posed to the fumes,90 but to occasional visitors to the plant as
well.91
Notwithstanding that no emission-control devices were
installed over the vats9 2 and that the plant was poorly venti-
lated,93 the level of cyanide gas in the plant was not moni-
tored.9 ' The workers commonly complained about inade-
quate ventilation and some-including Golab himself-had
asked to be transferred to another plant to escape the sicken-
ing fumes. 5 It was later determined that the level of cyanide
in the air exceeded permissible federal standards.9
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Office of the State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois, Press Re-
lease: Film Recovery Executives Face Prison Terms (June 18, 1985).
91. A medical supplier's saleswoman testified that after she became
nauseated and experienced other unpleasant symptoms on two visits to the
plant, she unsuccessfully tried to sell the company additional medical and
safety supplies and to contract for safety training classes. Gibson, Plant
Played Down Cyanide, Inspector Says, Chicago Tribune, May 9, 1985, at 10;
Gibson, Cyanide Gas Killed Worker, Coroner Says, Chicago Tribune, May 7,
1985, at 1; Tucker, Cyanide in Body: Examiner, Chicago Sun-Times, May 7,
1985, at 70.
92. Gibson, supra note 1.
93. A Polish co-worker of Mr. Golab's testified, for example, that
there were no ceiling fans in the plant and that windows in the facility
could not be opened. Tucker, A Shout . .. A Gasp . .. A Corporate Mur-
der?, Chicago Sun-Times, April 17, 1985, at 1.
94. State's Attorney October Press Release, supra note 87.
95. Tucker, supra note 93.
96. Because the company did not monitor cyanide gas levels in the
plant, the precise level on the date Mr. Golab died is unknown. What is
known, however, is that 12 days after his death the cyanide level remained
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The workers' daily routines included mixing cyanide
granules with water, stirring film chips in the solution with
long rakes, removing cyanide saturated chips from the vats,
and cleaning the tanks in preparation for the next batch.9"
Yet few safety precautions were evident. Flimsy paper masks
and cloth gloves were about all that protected these workers
from the deadly substance around which they worked,9 8 and
their cloth gloves became saturated with cyanide.9' As a re-
sult of direct contact with the solution, some workers suf-
fered chemical burns and partial loss of eyesight. 00
According to the product label, cyanide can be fatal in
three different ways: (1) ingestion; (2) absorption into the
skin; and (3) inhalation of hydrogen cyanide gas. 1 The
workers were not told, however, what the chemical was, how
hazardous it could be, or what precautions should be taken
when working with it.1"' Instead, a sign with the word
"poison" written in English and in Spanish was posted with-
out further explanation. 0 8 Mr. Golab spoke neither English
nor Spanish. 4
50% higher than that allowable under applicable federal standards and the
plant was not operating at full capacity that day. Gibson, Plant Played Down
Cyanide, Inspector Says, supra note 91. When county environmental officials
required the plant to install emission control devices before processing the
remaining film at the plant, cyanide emissions decreased twentyfold. Gib-
son, supra note 1.
97. Owens, supra note 54.
98. Tucker, supra note 93. A former worker testified that he wore
five paper masks at a time in order to breath better, but that the fumes still
came through. Gibson, Masks Didn't Stop Cyanide, Worker Says, Chicago
Tribune, April 25, 1985, at 4.
99. Dold, The Charge: Murder by Executive Decision, Chicago Sun-
Times, April 16, 1985, at 1.
100. Blanc, Hogan, Mallin, Hryhorczuk, Hessel & Bernard, Cyanide
Intoxication Among Silver-Reclaiming Workers, 253 J. A.M.A. 367, 370 (1985);
Owens, supra note 54; Tucker, supra note 93.
101. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 7.
102. Id. at 6-7. But see Gibson, No Cyanide Fumes, Plant Manager Says,
Chicago Tribune, May 23, 1985, § 2, at 13 (plant manager testified that he
told employees they were working with cyanide but that they did not un-
derstand what cyanide was; he testified further that he warned them about
wearing proper safety gear and fired some who refused to wear it).
103. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 6-7. An Hispanic em-
ployee testified through an interpreter that he interpreted the "poison"
sign in Spanish as a warning not to swallow the substance. Nelson, supra
note 86.
104. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 7.
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Causation: Stefan Golab died of acute cyanide toxicity. 105 The
cyanide level found in his blood was twice the lethal dose."0 6
Mr. Golab's coworkers, former FRS employees, insur-
ance and government inspectors, and police officers who in-
vestigated the incident on the day Golab died testified that
conditions at the plant were unbearable.107 According to the
investigating officers, a "yellowish haze" that hovered over
the area where Golab had been working was abrasive to their
eyes and throats and made them feel nauseous.0 8 The symp-
toms they described are classical effects of exposure to high
levels of hydrogen cyanide gas.'0 9
Culpability: The three individual defendants who were con-
victed knew that cyanide was regularly used at the plant and
that cyanide could be fatal." 0 All of them knew of the work-
ers' complaints about conditions at the plant and the physical
symptoms they routinely endured."'
Yet the defendants failed to disclose to the workers what
they themselves knew about hazards in the plant. Some trial
testimony suggests, moreover, that they may have actively
concealed the nature and extent of the danger as well. A
bookkeeper, for example, testified she had been instructed
not to use the word "cyanide" in the presence of plant work-
ers and not to linger in the part of the plant where the fumes
were heaviest."' Another witness testified that he had ob-
served the removal of skull and crossbones symbols from vats
105. Id. at 5-6. This cause of death was first suspected during the
performance of the autopsy. Mr. Golab's chest cavity smelled of almonds,
an odor associated with cyanide, and the odor was so strong that it stung
the eyes of the coroner and his assistant. Tucker, supra note 91.
106. Tucker, supra note 91.
107. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 5.
108. Nelson, 'Foul Haze Veiled Factory Death', The Daily Herald (Chi-
cago), April 16, 1985, at 1.
109. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 5-6. See also Blanc, Ho-
gan, Mallin, Hryhorczuk, Hessel & Bernard, supra note 100.
110. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 7-8.
111. Id. at 8. An inspector for the state-required workers compensa-
tion insurance program had earlier warned that too many vats were in the
plant. The number of vats was later increased threefold. Owens, supra note
54.
112. Mum was the Word on Cyanide: Worker, Chicago Tribune, May 3,
1985, at 4.
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containing the deadly poison,113 and yet another that he had
been told to lie to safety inspectors after Mr. Golab died.""
Upon evidence such as this Judge Banks concluded that
the individual defendants operated the silver-reclamation
plant in a manner they knew created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm and upon which he judged them
guilty of murder.115
And what of the corporation? Upon what state of the evi-
dence was Film Recovery Systems found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter? The indictment alleged that the company au-
thorized and performed acts of commission and omission
through the individual defendants acting in their managerial
capacities."' Under Illinois law, a corporation may be held
criminally liable for acts of its board of directors or high
managerial agents-i.e., corporate officers and other agents
who have comparable authority either to formulate corporate
policy or to supervise subordinate employees in a managerial
capacity" 7 -acting within the scope of their employment.'"
The corporate prosecution, then, proceeded on the the-
ory that the president, vice-president and plant foreman
113. Tucker, supra note 93. See also State's Attorney October Press
Release, supra note 87. One explanation for this conduct was a desire to
keep the process Film Recovery Systems used secret from the company's
competitors. Owens, supra note 54. Whether the symbol we so readily
identify as a poison warning would convey the same message to the immi-
grant workers is another matter. See Tucker, supra note 93 (Polish worker
testified that in Poland the skull and crossbones symbol signified electrical
hazard).
114. Gibson, Foreman Told Me to Lie After Man's Death, Worker Testi-
fies, Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1985, at 2.
115. The former president of the company claimed he was not re-
sponsible for plant operations and conditions on the date of Mr. Golab's
death because he had resigned his post before the incident occurred, Nel-
son, Film Recovery Leadership Can't Be Pinned Down, The Daily Herald (Chi-
cago), April 24, 1985, at 7, col. 1; Gibson, supra note 1, and was not pre-
sent in the State of Illinois on the date of death. People v. Film Recovery
Systems, Answer to People's Motion for Discovery (filed April 24, 1985)
(on file with the author). He continued to receive a salary from an affiliated
company that shared the same address as FRS, however, Nelson, supra, and
the court concluded that he continued to direct the operations of FRS.
Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 8-9. See also United States v. Cattle
King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 239 (10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a similar
argument by founder of meat packing company in prosecution for com-
pany's violation of federal meat inspection laws).
116. State v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., Indictment of October,
1985 Grand Jury (on file with the author). See supra note 5.
117. 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 5-4(b)(2).
118. I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 5-4(a)(2).
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caused Mr. Golab's death while acting within the scope of
their authority as managers of the firm. Judge Banks con-
cluded that the corporation recklessly tolerated mismanage-
ment of its affairs by allowing its officers and managers to
conduct its business in a manner that led to the death of one
employee and to the injury of numerous others."' 0 That, in
his view, amply supported the verdict of guilt.
Each of the defendants was, in addition, convicted of
fourteen counts of reckless conduct'" for recklessly injuring
or endangering other employees by failing to disclose the
identity and properties of the cyanide products in the plant




And where is the wisdom in all of this? Let us examine
the consequences of entrusting resolution of the Film Recov-
ery Systems problem to local law enforcement agencies.
Three corporate officers, each convicted of murder and four-
teen counts of reckless conduct, have been fined. and sen-
tenced to serve twenty-four years in prison for mismanaging
the firm.122 A defunct corporation, convicted of involuntary
manslaughter and fourteen counts of reckless conduct, has
been sentenced to pay a fine.12 To achieve these results, it
was necessary to rely upon a novel application of state penal
laws to deal with what is at bottom a tragic industrial
accident.
There are, of course, alternative approaches, principal
among them the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA). Congress enacted OSHA in 1970 to respond to a
"worsening trend" in the safety record of American indus-
try. 24 With this legislation, Congress strove to remedy not
just problems indigenous to particular industries but to re-
spond, instead, to a problem of urgent national concern.
More Americans were being killed on the job than had been
killed in the Vietnam war. 2b
119. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 10-11.
120. III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 12-5.
121. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 10-11; People v. Film
Recovery Systems, No. 8311091 (Oct. 3, 1983) (filed Nov. 4, 1983) (indict-
ments on file with the author).
122. Each defendant was fined $10,000. Dold, supra note 53.
123. The corporations were fined a total of $48,000. Id.
124. S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5178.
125. In the four years preceding enactment of the Occupational
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To promote OSHA's goal of providing all American
workers "safe and healthful working conditions,""12 Congress
authorized the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory safety
and health standards for businesses that affect interstate com-
merce 127 and encouraged other initiatives to reduce occupa-
tional deaths, injuries, and illnesses.
12 8
OSHA's scheme of liability derives from the imposition
of two duties upon employers. The first is a general duty to
furnish employees "employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm."12' 9 The
second is a duty to comply with specific occupational safety
and health rules promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.13
Violation of either of these duties is punishable by a civil
fine' 3' that may be imposed administratively,3 2 and willful
violation of a specific rule or regulation is punishable as a
crime when the violation results in an employee's death. 3
Safety and Health Act, industrial accidents killed 14,500 persons annually.
American industry was then experiencing a 20% higher rate of disabling
injuries per million man hours worked than had been the case in 1958. Id.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (b).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (b)(2).
128. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1)-(13), §§ 669-673.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). Employees also have a duty to comply
with OSHA rules, regulations and orders that are applicable to their own
conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b).
The Act relies upon two enforcement-related agencies. The Secretary of
Labor promulgates safety and health standards that are enforced through
periodic workplace inspections and issuance of citations, see 29 U.S.C. §§
655, 657, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ad-
judicates contested citations. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 661.
131. The maximum fine for most civil violations is $1,000. 29 U.S.C.
§ 665(b), (c). An employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the Act is
subject to a fine of as much as $10,000, however. 29 U.S.C. § 665(a).
132. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission is
authorized to assess civil penalties. 29 U.S.C. § 6660).
133. An employer whose willful violation of a standard, rule, or regu-
lation causes the death of an employee is subject to a fine of up to $10,000
and/or six months imprisonment. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e). A fine of $20,000
and/or a one year prison term may be imposed for conviction of a subse-
quent violation.
Willfulness does not require a finding of evil intent. United States v. Dye
Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975). A violation is willful if it is
"conscious, intentional, deliberate, and voluntary," F.X. Messina Constr.
Corp. v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 701, 702 (1st Cir. 1974), or exhibits "inten-
tional disregard .of, or plain indifference to the Act's requirements."
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OSHA's regulatory scheme seems well tailored to our
paradigm. The regulations, for example, require employers
to instruct employees in the safe and proper handling of poi-
sonous or toxic materials used in the workplace; 34 to advise
them of potential hazards and of personal protective mea-
sures needed to avoid injury; 3 5 to provide appropriate first
aid services and medical attention;3 6 to provide personal pro-
tective equipment for employees exposed to hazardous condi-
tions;' to classify the hazard potential of open surface tanks
like the cyanide vats and to ventilate the tanks to a degree
that eliminates the hazard to workers."'
Since OSHA directly addresses a host of technical indus-
trial health and safety issues upon which our homicide ver-
dicts of necessity are based, we must inquire whether it would
make better sense to fit the Film Recovery Systems case into
this model of liability and view OSHA as the appropri-
ate-and perhaps exclusive-mechanism through which em-
ployers are penalized for workplace deaths and injuries. Al-
though that prospect has simplicity and logic to recommend
it, closer scrutiny undermines its initial appeal.
First, the civil enforcement scheme is relatively weak.
The Act is directed primarily toward prevention of work-re-
lated injuries and illnesses. Although an employer may be
cited and fined for violations that have yet to produce a sin-
gle injury, a principal purpose of these citations is abatement
of the unsafe condition or practice. " 9 Imposition of a mone-
tary penalty is purely discretionary unless the violation is des-
ignated as "serious,""" and the maximum civil penalty for
Intercounty Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 780 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1072 (1976).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(a)(3), (5) (1985).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(a)(3) (1985).
136. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.23 (1985).
137. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) (1985).
138. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.94(1)(i), (2), (3) (1985).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
140. For purposes of civil liability, the Act differentiates between se-
rious and nonserious violations. An employer who is cited for a nonserious
violation-i.e., a violation that is not likely to result in death or serious
physical harm but that nonetheless directly affects employee safety and
health-is subject to a discretionary fine of up to $1,000. 29 U.S.C. §
666(c). An employer who is cited for a serious violation-i.e., a hazard that
creates a substantial probability of death or serious physical harm-is sub-
ject to a mandatory fine that may not exceed $1,000. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b). A
violation is not classified as a serious violaion if the employer could not
have learned of the violation by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 29
U.S.C. § 6660).
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serious violations is $1,000.141 Thus the civil penalty struc-
ture has no in terrorem deterrent value, especially where cor-
rection of the violation would be more costly than the
penalty.
14 1
The limited compliance incentives the Act provides are
further undercut by budgetary and staffing constraints.
OSHA has so few inspectors that it is able to inspect only a
small fraction of covered workplaces annually. 4 And under
a Reagan administration policy initiated in 1981, OSHA field
agents could inspect only businesses whose injury rates ex-
ceeded the national average, as determined by examination
of employer-maintained injury records.
That policy effectively prevented an OSHA inspector,
who visited the Film Recovery Systems office before Golab
died, from entering the plant to observe the offending condi-
tions. 145 Although workers later testified that they were sent
home for days at a time to rest rather than receiving treat-
141. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b).
142. Once a citation and abatement order have been issued, how-
ever, the threat of a significant punitive financial exaction becomes more
real. If the employer fails to correct the violation within the time alloted, a
civil penalty of up to $ 1,000 a day for each day the violation continues may
be assessed. 29 U.S.C. § 665(d).
Civil OSHA violations may result in years of protracted litigation. Cf
N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1986, at 9. (Inland Steel fined $100,000 for con-
tempt for failing to correct unsafe conditions at plant in accord with agree-
ment with OSHA; apparently concludes a 12 year battle begun by OSHA
in 1974 to correct major health hazards).
143. According to the Congressional Office of Technology Assess-
ment, OSHA's 1,200 inspectors evaluate fewer than 4% of the nation's
workplaces annually. Noble, Work Safety Agency Never Checked Fatal Factory,
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1985, at 10.
144. Office of Technology Assessment, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND IN-
JURY IN THE WORKPLACE 14 (1983). OSHA inspection procedures were later
modified to put every work site at risk of inspection, "although high-haz-
ard industries have a significantly higher chance of inspection." Noble, Cer-
tain Numbers Can Kill, N.Y. Times, November 28, 1986, at 12, col. 4 (quot-
ing Labor Department spokesman). On the targeting of high-hazard
industries, see generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR SEVENTY-SECOND AN-
NUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 34-35 (1985). As of mid-1986, OSHA
began conducting in-plant inspections of every tenth plant it visits regard-
less of the plant's safety records. OSHA Cracking Down on Underreporting of
Accidents, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 8, 1987, at 10E.
145. Owens, supra note 54. Cf Noble, supra note 144 ("There's no
doubt that the worker's life would have been saved if the inspector had
simply walked from the office to the shop floor.") (quoting Eric Fruming,
director of health and safety for the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union).
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ment for signs of poisoning,14 the company records reflected
little time lost due to work-related injury or illness."" In con-
sequence, the inspector could not inspect a plant that had be-
come or was about to become "a huge gas chamber"' 48 that
was "totally unsafe.
14 9
The results of the few inspections that actually do occur
scarcely reflect an aggressive enforcement policy. In fiscal
year 1983, for example, the average penalty assessed for seri-
ous violations-that is, violations that create a probability of
death or serious physical harm-was less than $200.5 o And
because the Commission may take into consideration the ap-
propriateness of any particular penalty in light of the size of
the business and other related factors,' the penalty ulti-
mately imposed may result from a compromise that does not
accurately reflect the true gravity of the violation.8 2 Indeed,
146. A Cook County Hospital later reported that at least two thirds
of the workers suffered from the major symptoms of cyanide poisoning at
least ten times a month. Owens, supra note 54.
147. Id. A Labor Department spokesman recently acknowledged that
OSHA's reliance on employer records may result in unreliable statistics on
work-related injuries and illnesses. Noble, supra note 144 (quoting Janet L.
Norwood, Commissioner of Labor Statistics). Cf Noble, U.S. May Fine
Chrysler in Worker Safety Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at 22, col. 5
(OSHA proposed fine of $910,000, second largest ever, for alleged willful
failure to keep accurate records in 182 cases of work-related injuries);
OSHA Cracking Down on Underreporting of Accidents, supra note 144 (report-
ing that, without admitting guilt, Chrysler agreed to pay fine of $295,332
and to bring record-keeping procedures into compliance with OSHA and
Bureau of Labor Statistics guidelines; alleged violations included failure to
report accidents sufficiently serious to cause lost workdays and result in
workers' compensation claims).
Although making false statements in required records may subject an
employer to criminal prosecution under 29 U.S.C. § 666(g), as of mid-1985
this provision had never been invoked. Owens, supra note 54.
148. State's Attorney October Press Release, supra note 94.
149. Report of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 6.
150. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 144.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j). Other factors specifically enumerated in the
statute include the seriousness of the violation, the employer's good or bad
faith, and any history of previous violations.152. In the Film Recovery Systems case, for example, OSHA cited
the company for two violations in the aftermath of Stefan Golab's death.
The citations faulted the company for failing to classify the vats' hazard
potential, failing to provide safe clothing and equipment, failing to provide
respirators, failing to provide cold running water to rinse cyanide off of the
skin, and failing to provide cyanide antidote in first aid kits. Although the
Commission originally proposed to fine the company $4,850, the amount
was later reduced by half because of the company's financial embarrass-
ment. Owens, supra note 54. A month after Golab died, Film Recovery
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recent policy changes encourage "settlement" of citations by
eliminating or reducing financial penalties in exchange for
the employer's promise to abate the hazardous condition and
comply with the law."'3
Considering these factors in tandem, a three-year study
of OSHA conducted by the congressional Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment concluded that "given the low probability of
inspections and the relatively low penalty rates, the incentive
for complying with OSHA standards before an OSHA inspec-
tion occurs is actually quite low."' " Thus, the nature and en-
forcement history of the civil compliance scheme suggest that
it is an unreliable tool for protecting worker health and
safety.
OSHA's criminal enforcement mechanism has proven no
more effective. For a number of possible reasons, only seven
criminal OSHA prosecutions were instituted during the first
twelve years the statute was in effect.1 56 One obvious disin-
centive to proceeding under OSHA's criminal provision is
that for first time offenders, the maximum fine for willful
criminal violations is the same as the maximum fine for will-
ful civil violations. 56 Thus, when the employer is a corpora-
Systems filed for bankruptcy in the wake of state and federal investigations
and a separate civil suit for injuries claimed to be suffered by eleven former
employees. Tucker, supra note 85.
153. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 144.
154. Id.
155. See Levin, Crimes Against Employees: Substantive Criminal Sanctions
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 717, 735-
36 (1977); Radin, supra note 6, at 66-67; Sheahan, The Employer's Criminal
Liability Under OSHA, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 322, 342 (1979). Of these seven
prosecutions, only one produced a reported decision. See United States v.
Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975). But cf United States v.
Pinkston-Hollar, Inc., 4 O.S.H. Cas. 1697 (D. Kan. 1976). No other crimi-
nal OSHA decisions have been published in the national reporter system
since that time.
156. Both are subject to a maximum $10,000 fine. Compare 29 U.S.C.
§ 666(e) with 29 U.S.C. § 666(a). The few criminal prosecutions that have
been pursued, moreover, have resulted in nominal penalties-if any at all.
See Levin, supra note 155, at 735-37; Radin, supra note 6, at 66-67.
The Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 will augment the fines that
can be imposed for most federal offenses, including criminal OSHA viola-
tions. Under the Act a corporation that is convicted of any federal felony
or of any federal misdemeanor resulting in death may be fined up to
$500,000, and an individual convicted of an offense in either of these cate-
gories may be fined as much as $250,000. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3623 (Law. Co-op.
1979 & Supp. 1986). A criminal OSHA violation is a federal misdemeanor
resulting in death. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
These changes in the law were originally scheduled to take effect on No-
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tion or other entity that cannot suffer imprisonment, the
Commission may perceive little or no immediate value in re-
ferring the matter to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution."" Unless the conduct of an employer who is an
individual-as opposed to an entity-is so egregious that im-
prisonment seems an appropriate sanction to pursue, OSHA
provides little incentive to follow the criminal enforcement
route.
Whether Congress meant to extend liability beyond the
corporate employer to the corporation's responsible officers
and agents is not entirely clear, moreover. 5 The term "em-
ployer" is defined to mean "a person engaged in a business
affecting commerce who has employees.' '159 Although a num-
ber of individual agents have been cited for civil and criminal
OSHA violations 60 courts have, on occasion, cast doubt on
the question whether individual corporate agents are employ-
ers within the contemplation of this definition."' Thus, it
vember 1, 1986, but Congress held them in abeyance pending the comple-
tion of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 note (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1986).
Unless Congress delays the effective date again, the enhanced penalties au-
thorized by the Fine Enforcement Act will become operative in November,
1987.
157. The employer's liability could be enhanced, on the other hand,
by imposition of both civil and criminal penalties for the same violation. See
Levin, supra note 155, at 736 (discussing United States v. Crosby & Over-
ton, No. CR-74-1832-F (D. Cal. 1975)).
Although greater penalties may be imposed upon a second conviction,
29 U.S.C. § 666(e), given what we know about OSHA enforcement policy
the prospect of two successful criminal prosecutions of the same employer
seems remote. Cf F.X. Messina Constr. Corp. v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 701,
702 (1st Cir. 1974) (employer who was earlier convicted of violating shor-
ing and trenching standards when trench cave-in killed employee pursued
civilly but not criminally after second fatal trench cave-in).
158. Compare Levin, supra note 155, at 731-32 (§ 666(e) provides
both corporate and individual liability) with Sheahan, supra note 155, at
331 n.46 (although a statutory scheme providing both corporate and indi-
vidual liability would be far preferable, the Act as presently drafted does
not admit to such an interpretation).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). The term "person" means "one or more
individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal
representatives, or any organized group of persons." 29 U.S.C. § 652(4).
160. All of the first four criminal prosecutions proceeded against
both corporate and individual defendants, see Levin, supra note 155, at
735-36, and two of the next three prosecutions named individual defend-
ants as well. See Radin, supra note 6, at 66-67.
161. Compare United States v. Dye Constr. Co., No. 73-CR-417 (D.
Colo. March 22, 1974) (motion to dismiss indictment against company's
president granted on the ground that the company, not the president, was
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remains uncertain whether OSHA's scheme of liability as-
cribes personal fault to individual business managers, except
in the case of a sole proprietor who had not the foresight to
do business in corporate form.
To conclude under these circumstances (as one judge
seems to have done)'62 that OSHA preempts the use of state
laws to penalize employers who act in disregard of their em-
ployees' safety would create an obvious enforcement void.
But laying aside policy considerations for the moment, the
preemption argument fairly misses the mark. Since Congress
specifically provided that OSHA shall not be construed to su-
persede or affect employers' common-law or statutory duties
and liabilities relating to work-related employee deaths and
injuries,' 63 it is difficult to construct a credible argument that
the employer) (reported in Levin, supra note 155, at 735), affd, 510 F.2d
78 (10th Cir. 1975) with United States v. Pinkston-Hollar, Inc., 4 O.S.H.
Cas. 1697 (D. Kan. 1976) (rejecting company vice-president's claim that he
could not be prosecuted as an employer). See also Skidmore v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 483 F.2d 67
(5th Cir. 1973) (OSHA does not impose duties on "employees of an em-
ployer, executive or otherwise").
The Justice Department believes that corporate officers and agents may
be criminally prosecuted for OSHA violations under the aiding and abet-
ting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), for causing or assisting the employer's
violation. U.S. Atty's Manual § 9-78.111 (Mar. 16, 1984).
162. See Middleton, supra note 2 (reporting dismissal, on federal pre-
emption grounds, of prosecution against five corporate officers for aggra-
vated battery, reckless conduct, and conspiracy to commit aggravated bat-
tery by subjecting workers to " 'poisonous and stupefying substances,' " for
failing to provide proper safety instructions and equipment, and for
"'maintaining an unsafe workplace' ").
163. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensa-
tion law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the com-
mon law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employ-
ees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment." OSHA preempts only
those state laws that duplicate or conflict with specific federal standards
promulgated under § 655, and then only to the extent that the state has
failed to gain federal approval of a state plan to regulate on that subject.
29 U.S.C. § 667 (1982).
Cf State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ohio St. 2d 4, 402
N.E.2d 528 (1980) (OSHA does not preempt state safety requirement pro-
viding basis for award of additional worker's compensation benefits); West
Virginia Mfgs. Assoc. v. West Virginia, 542 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.W. Va.
1982), aft'd, 714 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1983) (OSHA does not preempt state
statute requiring notice and posting of workplace hazards absent a specific
federal standard); P & Z Co. v. District of Columbia, 408 A.2d 1249 (D.C.
App. 1979) (OSHA does not preempt misdemeanor provision of District of
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Congress nonetheless intended to preclude the use of state
penal statutes to punish employers who recklessly kill and in-
jure in the workplace." 4
V. COMPETING POLICIES
A decision to permit imposition of criminal liability in a
case like this inevitably requires the balancing of competing
policy considerations. Corporate enterprises like Film Recov-
ery Systems are engaged in legitimate commercial activity,
and if local prosecutors are to second-guess reasoned business
judgments, we must recognize the risk that adverse conse-
quences may follow. It may be unwise to permit a jury to
speculate about management's knowledge of the probability
of death or injury, for example, for once the untoward result
has occurred the jury acts with the benefit of hindsight. Man-
agers who would otherwise choose to assume an active role in
making the workplace safer may therefore feel a need to in-
sulate themselves from learning too much lest they become
subject to criminal prosecution for making an erroneous busi-
ness judgment.
16 5
Despite its facial appeal as a means of limiting liability,
remaining ignorant of crucial facts is at best a dubious solu-
tion for management's dilemma. Under the willful blindness/
conscious avoidance doctrine-which is well established in
other contexts"'6 -deliberate ignorance of the truth may
Columbia Industrial Safety Act); Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d
10 (Mo. App. 1982) (absent a specific federal standard, OSHA does not
preempt state common law concerning exposure to tobacco smoke in work-
place); Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d
408 (Ch. Div. 1976) (OSHA does not preempt common-law right to safe
working environment, including air free from tobacco smoke).
For examples of when and how OSHA does preempt state law, see Ohio
Manufacturers' Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986); New
Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1985); United Steel Workers of America v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.
1985).
164. That is not to say, of course, that Congress lacks the power to
preempt state penal laws. See generally Crampton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson: A
Case Study in Federal Pre-emption, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 85 (1958).
165. See Tucker, supra, note 93.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 959 (2d Cir.)
(Securities Act of 1933), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976); United States v.
Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976)
(Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act); United States v.
Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-13 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973)
(firearms offense); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287-88 (2d Cir.)
(stolen securities), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v.
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serve as a substitute for positive knowledge. One who deliber-
ately closes his eyes to the obvious may be charged with
knowledge of that which he ought to have seen, 167 so guilty
knowledge may be inferred when others in the actor's situa-
tion would have known facts he has consciously avoided dis-
covering himself. 68 The willful blindness/conscious avoid-
ance standard thus may prevent corporate management
"from circumventing criminal sanctions merely by deliber-
ately closing [their] eyes to the obvious risk that [they are]
engaging in unlawful conduct."169
But lines of corporate authority are often blurred. Cor-
porations are, after all, organized and managed by commit-
tees and boards, and this fact of organizational life makes
more difficult the task of tracing where responsibility ulti-
mately should lie. To ascribe personal blame to a few select
individuals when responsibility is collective raises the disquiet-
ing spectre that one who has neither authority nor control
over an offending hazard may be held to account for failing
to prevent or abate it. The unfairness inherent in that pros-
pect suggests compelling grounds for declining to pierce the
corporate veil."7
The law is not so illogical, however, as to punish one for
failing to accomplish that which is beyond his power to
Grizaffi, 471 F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1972) (mail fraud), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
964 (1973); United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972)
(false statements).
167. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786-87 & n.28 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d
461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); United States v. Ben-
jamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
168. United States v. Vasen, 222 F.2d 3, 7, 8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 834 (1955). "Deliberate disregard" for the truth may be found,
and knowledge thus imputed, when the actor was "aware of the risk that
his conduct was illegal but proceeded nonetheless." United States v. Gen-
tile, 530 F.2d 461, 470 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); Stone v.
United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940).
169. United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972).
170. But cf. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 417 (1962) (Harlan,
J., concurring) ( "[T]he fiction of corporate entity, operative to protect of-
ficers from contract liability, ha[si never been applied as a shield against
criminal prosecutions .... "). See also United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512
F.2d 1361, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (corporate officers are criminally liable
for conduct performed in their representative capacities even though they
may not have directed or authorized the corporation's violation of the law).
If the rule were otherwise, "the fines established to deter crime become
mere license fees for illegitimate corporate business operations." United
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 409 (1962).
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achieve. 1" The duty must, therefore, coalesce with the capac-
ity to act,' 72 and one cannot act upon that over which he
wields no control. Thus, a corporate officer's inaction consti-
tutes a criminal omission only if he has some degree of af-





But even assuming a degree of control, what about the
danger that may be inherent in the workplace? Consider a
construction site, for example. There is at least a substantial
risk (if not a probability) that one of the construction workers
at a high-rise building site will be killed or seriously injured
on the job,7 5 and that risk is clearly known and understood
by the construction company's management. Does it there-
fore follow that the managers are forever in peril of criminal
prosecution for the foreseen (or at least foreseeable) death or
injury when it occurs?
The answer, of course, is no. As a general matter, em-
ployees are deemed to assume the ordinary risks inherent in
the nature of their work.'17 When the market functions as we
171. United States v. Weisenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91
(1964). Nor can a corporate officer be said to have caused a forbidden re-
sult that he was "powerless" to prevent. United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658, 673 (1975). A causal relationship between the inaction and the result
will exist only if the actor is capable of influencing the outcome.
172. See LaFave, supra note 42, at § 3.3(c).
173. Cf United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 665 n.9 (1975) (uphold-
ing conviction of president of national grocery chain for Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act violation that occurred in a distant warehouse; he had a "re-
sponsible relation to the situation even though he may not have partici-
pated personally"); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943)
(upholding conviction of president of pharmaceutical company for shipping
misbranded drugs; test for determining personal guilt under Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act is whether the officer "shares responsibility in the busi-
ness process" that results in the violation); United States v. Cattle King
Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 240 (10th Cir.) (approving responsible share
standard of liability under Federal Meat Inspection Act), cert. denied, 107
S.Ct. 573 (1986); Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61, 66
(4th Cir.), affd, 323 U.S. 18 (1944) (convictions under Filled Milk Act). See
generally Brickey, supra note 78.
174. People v. International Steel, 266 P.2d 587, 592 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1951).
175. The construction industry has the highest rate of occupation-
related injuries and illnesses and the second highest rate of occupational
fatalities. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational In-
juries and Illnesses in the United States by Industry, 1984, at 3, 6 (May 1986).
176. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 215 (1879). Cf Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency § 521 (1957) (master not liable for harm caused
by unsafe premises or working conditions if servant knows the facts and
understands the risks).
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expect it to, they will have taken the risks into consideration
when they arrange their compensation.' 77 The construction
workers with whose fate we are concerned are paid to assume
commensurately greater risks,"7 ' and their employers pre-
sumably have an interest in protecting them from injury.
179
But if the picture portrayed by the prosecution in the
Film Recovery Systems case is reasonably accurate, the mar-
ket can fail miserably. For rather than discovering that the
hazards were accounted for in the employees' compensation
arrangement, we find the situation at Film Recovery Systems
portrayed as the exploitation of unskilled workers who ur-
gently needed gainful employment.'8 0 Laboring under what
they knew were unbearable conditions, they were both help-
less to complain and unable to appreciate the lethal nature of
the hazard to which they were routinely exposed.
Although assumption of the risk will bar an injured party from recover-
ing damages from a negligent party, the assumption of risk doctrine has no
formal role in the criminal law. That is not to say, however, that an injured
party's consent or contributory negligence can never be considered rele-
vant in a criminal prosecution. When individuals subject themselves to a
risk of harm by engaging in lawful activities such as organized contact
sports, for example, one may legitimately consent to infliction of bodily
harm within the rules of the game. See LaFave, supra note 42, at § 5.11.
Thus to the extent that an employee's consent to normal workplace
hazards is uncoerced and no fraud is involved, neither civil nor criminal
liability should lie.
177. For explanations of the theory of compensating wage differen-
tials and descriptions of its empirical foundations, see generally R. Posner,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 246-47 (2d ed. 1977); W. Viscusi, RISK BY
CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE ch. 3, ch. 6
(1983) [hereinafter RISK BY CHOICE]; W. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE ch. 15-16 (1979); Smith, Compen-
sating Wage differentials and Public Policy: A Review, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 339 (1979); Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from
the Labor Market, 40 STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH 265 (1975); Viscusi,
Union, Labor Market Structure, and the Welfare Implications of the Quality of
Work, I J. LAB. RES. 175 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Quality of Work].
178. See Greenhouse, Responsibility for Job Safety, N.Y Times, June 25,
1985, at 30, col. 2 ("(sjome construction companies pay people enormous
premiums to do dangerous work way up high") (quoting Richard A.
Epstein).
179. See Interviews with Ronald Reagan: Sharp Contrasts with Carter's
Economics, Bus. WK. March 31, 1980, at 94, 95.
180. The theory of compensating wage differentials has major limita-
tions when, as here, workers possess inadequate risk information and are
less risk averse. RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 177, at ch. 4; see also Quality of
Work, supra note 177, at 175.
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If the prosecution's evidence is to be believed, moreover,
Film Recovery Systems' management concealed the danger
even after Mr. Golab died. One coworker who continued to
work at the plant testified that he was not informed that Go-
lab had died. He was told, instead, that Golab was recovering
and that the workers "shouldn't worry about it."'' And ac-
cording to an OSHA inspector who visited the plant after
Golab died, the company president even then expressed his
desire not to overemphasize plant hazards for fear of scaring
the workers away." 2
But working with cyanide-like doing high-rise construc-
tion work-will always pose risks, and the risks are incurred
at the behest of enterprises engaged in socially useful pur-
suits.'88 Taking risks-perhaps even substantial risks-may
be necessary to encourage socially productive activity. At
what point, then, do we say the employer's risk taking be-
comes a criminal matter?
The line of demarcation between acceptable and unac-
ceptable risks obviously cannot be drawn solely with refer-
ence to the degree of risk involved. It must accommodate,
instead, both the utility and morality of risk-taking under a
given set of circumstances. Thus, to ascribe criminal culpabil-
ity requires more than a finding that a risk is substantial. It
must be both substantial and unjustified.
To expose one's employees to known risks would be war-
ranted, for example, if the risks are inherent in the nature of
the work and reasonable precautions have been taken to min-
imize them. Thus, the construction company management
would be justified in having a properly trained and equipped
welder work on the twentieth floor of a steel superstructure,
provided that permanent or temporary flooring, guardrails,
safety nets, safety lines, or other appropriate safety devices
were in place.' In stark contrast, to expose one's employees
to concealed risks when few-if any-precautions have been
taken, would be manifestly unjustifiable.
Management's decision to proceed in either case inevita-
bly affects the bottom line, of course. At some point manage-
ment must make a calculated cost-benefit judgment about
181. Nelson, supra note 86.
182. Gibson, supra note 91. The president flatly denied this allega-
tion. Id.
183. As contrasted with a drunk driver who careens into a pedes-
trian.
184. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1926.750 (1985) (enumerating OSHA
flooring requirements for skeleton steel construction in tiered buildings).
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profitability, and one can only draw unfavorable inferences
from the Film Recovery Systems trial. One worker testified,
for example, that the only response to his complaints about
inadequate plant ventilation was "no money.' 8 5 Yet when
silver prices were climbing, the company grossed $13-20 mil-
lion annually and capitalized on the favorable market by ex-
panding its operations. ' "
As this expansion occurred, a worker's compensation in-
surance inspector noted that the converted warehouse con-
tained too many vats.' 7 But business is business. To meet
market demands for the reclaimed silver, the number of cya-
nide vats more than doubled."8 In the meantime, manage-
ment offices were moved to newly acquired space in an adja-
cent building. And as of the date of Stefan Golab's death, not
a soul would claim-or even acknowledge-responsibility for
plant operations or conditions.'
CONCLUSION
If only one lesson were to be drawn from this unfortu-
nate state of affairs it would be this: issues of workplace safety
must transcend profit maximization. We cannot allow man-
agement to follow the line of least resistance by forego-
ing-on economic grounds-a course of action that would
make a workplace safe while at the same time pursuing-on
pragmatic grounds-a course of action that masks the seri-
ousness of the hazards in order to minimize their workers'
concerns. The law should not permit them "to make so unso-
ciable a gamble."' 90
185. Tucker, supra note 93.
186. Owens, supra note 54.
187. Id. Siegel, supra note 53.
188. Owens, supra note 54.
189. Nelson, supra note 115.
190. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What it Might Mean, If it
Were Really to Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV. 557, 565 (1986). For a cook's tour of
the literature, see J. Braithwaite, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTI-
CAL INDUSTRY (1984); C. Stone, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); CORRIGIBLE
CORPORATIONS & UNRULY LAW (B. Fisse & P. French eds. 1985); CORPORA-
TIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM (D. DeMott ed. 1980);
CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS (E. Hochstedler ed. 1984); Coffee, Beyond the
Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Elkins, Corporations and
the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976); Glasbeek, Why
Corporate Deviance is Not Targeted as a Crime-The Need to Make "Profits" a
Dirty Word, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 393 (1984); Pilon, Corporations and
Rights: On Treating Corporate People Justly, 13 GA. L. REV. 1171 (1979). See
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Suppose, however,-as his lawyer insists-that the rise
of the president of this enterprise represents the "epitome of
the American dream."19 These were not, after all, wealthy
captains of industry. They began a modest business that be-
came, in the end, a casualty of a declining market and its own
management style. 9" Is it appropriate to invoke the threat of
criminal prosecution as a barrier to market entry for the in-
experienced, and perhaps the unwise?
The answer may be yes. Every year the introduction of
toxic substances and other hazardous products and processes
into the work environment becomes increasingly common-
place. 9 As the dangers inherent in the workplace increase,
one might posit, so should the entrepreneurial stakes be
raised. Inexperience and undercapitalization are, after all, in-
adequate to justify industrial Russian roulette. Thus, threat-
ened use of criminal prosecution in cases like this may dis-
courage the proliferation of irresponsible businesses in indus-
tries where they threaten the most harm.1 9'
That purpose need not be singular, however. For even
though some would suggest that this episode could not have
occurred in a normal corporate environment, 95 we are left
to wonder why that is true. Can we forget so quickly the
many dead or dying asbestos workers whose claims still lan-
also Corporate Criminal Liability: Hearings on H.R. 4973 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1979-1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
191. Gibson, Judge Prepares to Rule in Murder Trial of Company Offi-
cials, Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1985, §2 at 3.
192. See Gibson, Cyanide Level Safe, Executive Testifies, Chicago Trib-
une, May 30, 1985, at 1.
193. As early as 1970, when OSHA was enacted, it was estimated
that new and potentially toxic chemicals were being introduced into indus-
try at a rate of one every 20 minutes. S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5178.
194. See Spiegel, The Liability of Corporate Officers, 71 A.B.A. Journal
48, 50 (Nov. 1985) (quoting Christopher Stone).
195. But cf Comment, supra note 2 (detailing manslaughter prosecu-
tion initiated against General Dynamics Corporation for death of employee
overcome by toxic solvent while servicing a tank). Philip Morris Unit Facing
Manslaughter Indictment, Wall St. J. Nov. 13, 1986, at 4 (reporting indict-
ment of Philip Morris U.S.A. for involuntary manslaughter in connection
with the death of an employee in a tobacco processing machine). In a civil
context, see Reinhold, Jurors Assess Monsanto $108 Million Over Death, N.Y.
Times, December 13, 1986, at 10 (city ed.) (jury award of $8 million actual
and $100 million punitive damages for leukemia death of worker; worker's
predecessor also contracted leukemia, and suit alleged that company did
not properly monitor benzine level in workers' bodies and did not equip
them with protective gear).
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guish in the courts, for example? We cannot dismiss out of
hand the charge that known dangers to those workers were
concealed or minimized by the asbestos industry for a consid-
erable period of years. 9' Nor can we dismiss out of hand the
charge that consumer product manufacturers likewise
make-at least on occasion-cost benefit decisions that exalt
profit over life and limb, that calculate the economics of an-
ticipated wrongful death claims resulting from a known and
correctable hazard and then offset against that cost the eco-
nomics of preventing the deaths. 9
Perhaps, then, it is not inappropriate that the criminal
justice system should play a role in the regulatory process
when management crosses the line. It may play a particularly
effective role at that, for the prosecutor has at his disposal
the coercive investigatory powers of the state. His investiga-
tion, moreover, is immune from the automatic stays in bank-
ruptcy proceedings that permit witnesses and claimants to die
and evidence to grow stale before the truth can be found and
the blameworthy judged accountable.198 Perhaps, upon re-
flection, the criminal justice system will prove to be a highly
desirable regulatory alternative because of the swiftness and
sureness of its response.
196. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.
3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980); Hearings, supra note 190,
at 36-116 (statement of Barry Castleman, environmental consultant and en-
gineer). See generally P. Brodeur, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT--THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985); Motley, The Lid Comes Off, 16 TRIAL 21 (April
1980).
197. See, e.g., L. Strobel, RECKLESS HOMICIDE? FORD'S PINTO TRIAL
286 (Figure 11) (1980).
198. Cf 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (fines, penalties
and forfeitures payable to and for benefit of government not dischargeable
in bankruptcy); Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S.Ct. 353 (1986) (restitution obliga-
tion imposed as condition of probation in state criminal proceeding not
dischargeable in bankruptcy).
[Vol. 2
